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I construct a secure multiparty scheme to compute a classical function by a succinct use of a specially
designed fault-tolerant random polynomial quantum error correction code. This scheme is secure provided that
~asymptotically! strictly more than five-sixths of the players are honest. Moreover, the security of this scheme
follows directly from the theory of quantum error correcting code, and hence is valid without any computa-
tional assumption. I also discuss the quantum-classical complexity-security tradeoff in secure multiparty com-
putation schemes and argue why a full-blown quantum code is necessary in my scheme.
PACS number~s!: 03.67.Dd, 03.67.Hk, 03.67.Lx, 89.70.1cI. INTRODUCTION
Quantum computers are more powerful than classical
computers in a number of applications such as integer fac-
torization @1#, database search @2# and secret key distribution
@3,4#. In addition, careful use of entanglement reduces the
multiparty communication complexity of certain functions
@5# and allows secret sharing @6#. On the other hand, certain
postmodern cryptographic applications, including bit com-
mitment @7# and ideal two-party secure computation @8#, are
impossible if the cheater has a quantum computer. Thus, it is
important to investigate the power and limitation of quantum
computers. Moreover, the quantum versus classical and se-
curity versus complexity tradeoffs for certain multiparty
computational tasks deserve in-depth study.
In this paper, I analyze the quantum versus classical and
security versus complexity tradeoffs in secure multiparty
computation. In secure multiparty computation, n players
each with a private classical input xi want to compute a
commonly agreed classical function z5 f (x1 ,x2 , . . . ,xn) in
such a way that ~i! all players either know the value of z or
abort after detecting a cheater or eavesdropper, ~ii! no one
can gain information on the private input of an honest player
except those logically following z, and ~iii! a limited number
of cheating players cannot alter the final outcome z. More-
over, the above three conditions hold even if all cheaters and
eavesdroppers cooperate.
Secure multiparty computation can be used as a basic
building block for a number of extremely useful protocols
including secure election and anonymous messages broad-
cast. Thus, it is important to devise a secure multiparty com-
putation scheme that tolerates as many cheaters as possible
on the one hand, and requires as few communications be-
tween the players as possible on the other.
Several classical secure multiparty computation schemes
exist in the literature. The security of some of these schemes
@9# is based on the security of either certain ~classical! oblivi-
ous transfer or ~classical! bit commitment protocols. Hence
their methods are insecure if a cheating player has unlimited
computational power. Ben-Or et al. @10# and Chaum et al.
@11# independently proposed multiparty computation meth-
*Electronic address: hfchau@hkusua.hku.hk1050-2947/2000/61~3!/032308~9!/$15.00 61 0323ods based on a distributed computing version of the so-called
(k ,n)-secret sharing scheme @12#. Their schemes are uncon-
ditionally secure provided that fewer than one-third of the
players cheat. This is true even when the cheaters cooperate.
The one-third cheating player bound is tight among all clas-
sical protocols that allow secret communications between
any two players @10#. Later Rabin and Ben-Or showed that if
each player can broadcast a message to all other players and
each pair of players can communicate secretly, then there is
an unconditionally secure way to compute z fewer if less
than one-half of the players cheat @13#. The one-half cheating
player bound is tight among all classical schemes that allow
secret communications between any two players as well as in
public broadcasting @13#.
How many resources are required in classical condition-
ally secure multiparty computation? In all classical schemes
known to date, the n players must communicate securely
with others. Hence, n(n21)/2 classical secure communica-
tion channels are required. Suppose each player has a private
input of length k, then initially they have to distribute their
private inputs via certain secret sharing schemes. To do so,
each player has to send out O(nk) bits. Thus, O(n2k) bits of
~secret! classical communication are necessary for the initial
setup in the whole system. To perform distributed computa-
tion, up to O(n2k) bits of ~secret! communication and com-
putation per arithmetical operation are required @10,13#. In
addition, to verify that every player’s secret input is correctly
distributed in the secret sharing scheme, an extra O(n3k) bits
of communications are needed @10,11,13#. Since the number
of secret communication channels scales quadratically with
the number of players, classical secure multiparty computa-
tion is rarely used in practice for more than, say, ten players
@14#. In fact, the classical schemes by Ben-Or et al. and
Chaum et al., being generic, are designed primarily to point
out the plausibility of secure multiparty computation.
II. QUANTUM SECURE MULTIPARTY COMPUTATION
SCHEME
Now, let me report a quantum secure multiparty compu-
tation scheme that requires fewer communication channels
and resources at the expense of tolerating fewer cheaters.
Without lost of generality, I may assume that the private
input for each player as well as the output of the function f©2000 The American Physical Society08-1
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scheme goes as follows
~1! All players agree on a common computational
basis for quantum computation, an exponentially small
security parameter e.0, as well as two random polynomial
quantum error correcting codes ~QECC’s! C1 and C2 @15#.
In particular, they choose C1 to be the @@n ,1,d##q code where
the prime q.n , and 3d<n12. More precisely, C1 en-
codes each qary quantum register ua0& into n qary quan-






d21&/q (d21)/2 where yi are distinct nonzero elements
in Fq . The distance of this code is d and hence it can correct
up to d[@(d21)/2# errors.1 Furthermore, I denote the





211an2d11yin2d11&/q (n2d11)/2 by C˜ 1. In addi-
tion, C2 is chosen to be the @@4d811,1,2d811##q random
polynomial QECC @15# whose fidelity of quantum computa-
tion using imperfect devices is greater than 12e . ~Since the
random polynomial QECC C2 has a fault-tolerant implemen-
tation @15#, by concatenate coding, the threshold theorem in
fault-tolerant quantum computation guarantees the existence
of such a QECC C2 @15–17#.! As we shall see later on, the
choice of the value of the distance d affects only the number
of cheaters that can be tolerated by the scheme.
~2! Each player sets up a quantum channel with a central
routing station. He or she may establish relay stations along
each quantum channel in such a way that the noise level in
each quantum channel segment is small enough to perform
entanglement purification. ~See Refs. @18–20# for details.!
Furthermore, each player also has access to a classical public
unjammable channel for broadcasting.
~3! The players, central routing channel and relay stations
separately prepare a few copies of the state uF&
[(k50
q21ukk&/Aq . They encode each copy using QECC C2,
and share these encoded states uF& between the two ends of
each quantum communication channel segment. Then, they
perform a fault-tolerant entanglement purification procedure
as discussed in Refs. @19,20# on these shared states. Next,
these possibly impure encoded states uF& shared between
each channel segment from one player to another are con-
nected together by quantum teleportation @4,18,21#. Finally,
each pair of players tests the purity of their shared encoded
states uF& by a variation of the fault-tolerant random hashing
technique described in Ref. @4#. ~Readers may refer to Ap-
pendixes A and B for detailed descriptions of the teleporta-
tion and random hashing procedures, respectively.! They
proceed to step ~4! only if the random hashing test is passed
for each pair of players. In this case, each pair of players will
share a number of almost perfect encoded logical states uF& .
The entanglement shared between each pair of players in this
way can then be used to securely transport states among
themselves in step ~4!. Clearly, shared uF& is not the only
1The distance of this code is less than that reported in Ref. @15#.
Nonetheless, I still call this a random polynomial code because this
code closely resembles that reported in Ref. @15#.03230possible way to establish such an entanglement. In fact, one
may replace the state uF& in this scheme by an Einstein-
Podolsky-Rosen ~EPR! pair. Nevertheless, the scheme will
become slightly complicated after such a replacement for
one has to teleport qary instead of binary quantum registers
in step ~4!.
~4! Let xi be the private classical input of player i; then he
or she prepares s5Olog(1/e) copies of the state uxi&. He or
she also prepares a number of preset quantum registers u0&
that will be used later on in the reversible quantum compu-
tation. Player i first encodes each of his or her prepared quan-
tum registers using the QECC C1. Then, player i further
encodes the j th quantum register in each of his or her en-
coded states using C2 and teleports the resultant quantum
registers to player j using their previously shared encoded
state uF& from step ~3! for all jÞi . He or she also encodes
each of the ith quantum registers by C2 and keeps those
quantum registers himself or herself. All players keep their
received quantum registers private as well. In what follows, I
use the subscript ‘‘L’’ to the state ket to denote a state that is
encoded and distributed among the n players using this pro-
cedure. In addition, the players also prepare a number of
preset quantum registers u0&, encode it first by C˜ 1, and then
by C2. The players then distribute these encoded preset reg-
isters among themselves in a similar way as in sharing their
private inputs. I use the subscript ‘‘L˜’’ to the state ket to
denote such an encoded and distributed state. States u0&L and
u0&L˜ will be used as preset registers during the reversible
computation in step ~6!.
~5! In order to make sure that everyone follows step ~4!
honestly, a player j ~the verifier! may challenge a randomly
chosen player i ~the prover! using a fault-tolerant random
parity check method similar to that used in Ref. @4#. More
precisely, player j publicly announces a sequence $ck%k51s of
integers in Fq such that (k51
s ck50. Then every player is
required to help player j to compute the random parity
(k51
s ckxik by distributed fault-tolerant quantum computation
~FTQC!, where xik denotes the state of the kth copy of the
private input of player i. Clearly, the choice of QECC’s C1
and C2 enables us to perform the above quantum computa-
tion in a fault-tolerant way without any measurement and
ancilla @15#. Also, the method of distributing the private in-
put state in step ~4! allows the players to perform the above
FTQC in a distributed manner without any communication
between them.
To verify if the result computed ~which I call the random
parity! is equal to zero, all players measure and publicly
announce their measurement outcome along their commonly
agreed computational basis on their corresponding C2 en-
coded quantum registers that encode the random parity. Be-
cause C1 is an @@n ,1,d##q random polynomial QECC, the
measurement results of the players correspond to the classi-
cal @n ,d ,n2d11#q Reed-Solomon encoding of the random
parity. Naturally, they continue only if the random parity
inferred from this classical Reed-Solomon encoding is zero.
This verification process has to repeat Olog(1/e) times for
each proving player i so as to guarantee security.
In addition, all players use a similar distributed fault-8-2
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rity of the distributed encoded preset quantum registers u0&L
and u0&L˜ among themselves. They proceed to step ~6! only
when all the measurement results are consistent with the as-
sumption that there is no cheater or eavesdropper around.
Thus, in order to establish the required security, Olog(1/e)
private input states prepared and distributed in step ~4! are
wasted. ~An alternative way to perform the random parity
check measurement is to ask the players to teleport their
shares of the encoded random parity quantum registers to the
verifier. Then the verifier makes the appropriate measure-
ment and publicly announces the outcome.!
~6! To compute the commonly agreed classical function
z5 f (x1 ,x2 , . . . ,xn), the n players perform distributed
FTQC on their received quantum particles. The players keep
every quantum state private except the final result.
To be precise, they first decompose the classical function
f into a commonly agreed composition of elementary opera-
tors. Each elementary operator is in the form of ~i! register-
wise addition ux&°ux1a& , ~ii! registerwise multiplication
ux&°uax&, ~iii! generalized controlled - NOT gate ~C-NOT!
ux ,y&°ux ,x1y&, and ~iv! generalized Toffoli gate
ux ,y ,z&°ux ,y ,z1xy&, for some fixed aÞ0 @22#.
At this point, each player should have r5Olog(1/e)
,s remaining quantum registers distributed among them-
selves. Moreover, all the remaining distributed quantum
states of an honest player, upon quantum error correction,
should be identical. Clearly, the choice of the random poly-
nomial QECC’s C1 and C2 together with the private secure
distribution method in step ~4! allow, the players to perform
the first three types of elementary operators without any
measurement or communication between the players @15#.
Thus, they can perform the fault-tolerant operation on the r
remaining distributed quantum registers one by one. In this
way, they end up with r identical resultant states if they are
honest.
To perform the fourth type of elementary operator,
namely, a generalized Toffoli gate on the r remaining dis-
tributed encoded states, the players do the following. First,
they collectively synthesize the distributed state
(a ,b50
q21 ua ,b ,ab&L /q3/2 among themselves using their verified
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a ,b ,c ,k ,x50
q21
vq
k(ab2c1x)ua ,b ,c&L^ ux&L˜ , ~1d!03230where vq is a primitive qth root of unity.
To arrive at Eq. ~1a! in a fault-tolerant manner, each
player i simply has to perform the local Fourier transforma-
tion ua&°(b50
q21vq
miabub&/Aq on his or her corresponding
quantum registers, where miPFq is a unique solution for the
system of equations ( i51
n mi51 and ( i51
n miy i5( i51
n miy i
2
55( i51n miy in2150. I denote this fault-tolerant transfor-
mation by F. In fact, Appendix C shows that Fu0&L
5(k50
q21uk&L˜ and Fu0&L˜5(k50
q21uk&L . Then Aharonov and
Ben-Or tell us how to arrive at Eqs. ~1b! by fault-tolerant
controlled-phase-shift gate without any communication be-
tween the players @15#. More precisely, each player i applies
ua ,b&°vq
piabua ,b& to their share of the third and fourth
quantum registers where piPFq satisfies ( i51
n pi521 and
( i51
n piy i5( i51
n piy i
255( i51n piy i2d50. Subsequently,
arriving at Eq. ~1c! from Eq. ~1b! requires the
fault-tolerant controlled-controlled-phase-shift gate
ua ,b ,c&L°vq
abcua ,b ,c&L . For the random polynomial code
C1 with 3d<n12, this operation is achieved when each
player i applies the controlled-controlled-phase-shift gate
ua ,b ,c&°vq
riabcua ,b ,c& to his or her corresponding share of
the encoded first, second, and third quantum registers, where
riPFq is the solution ~not necessarily unique unless 3d11




255( i51n riy i3d50. Finally, to arrive at Eq.
~1d! from Eq. ~1c! in a fault-tolerant way, the players simply
apply the same local Fourier transform F that creates Eq.
~1a! to their share of the fourth quantum register. ~Again, the
proof can be found in Appendix C.! In summary, the players
can evolve their share of quantum states to Eq. ~1d! in a
fault-tolerant manner without any measurement, communica-
tions or the use of ancillary particles.
After the players have evolved their quantum particles to
the distributed state in Eq. ~1d!, they measure their share of
the fourth encoded quantum register along the commonly
agreed computational basis and then publicly announce their
measurement results. In this way, they end up having a clas-
sical @n ,n2d11,d#q Reed-Solomon code and after error
correction, they can infer the measurement outcome of the
fourth encoded quantum register along the commonly agreed
computational basis. Suppose the inferred measurement re-
sult is l , then the state ket of the remaining three
distributed encoded quantum registers becomes
(a ,b ,c ,k50
q21 vq
k(ab2c1l)ua ,b ,c&L /q25(a ,b50
q21 ua ,b ,ab1l&L /q .
So, by applying a fault-tolerant generalized C-NOT gate de-
pending on the measurement result l , they eventually syn-
thesize the state (a ,b50
q21 ua ,b ,ab&L /q collectively.
At this point, using their newly synthesized distributed
encoded state (a ,b50
q21 ua ,b ,ab&L /q as ancilla, the n players
implement the generalized Toffoli gate in a fault-tolerant
manner using a variation of Gottesman’s method in Ref.
@23#. ~See also Ref. @17# for details.! More precisely, they
perform the following transformation using a number of
fault-tolerant generalized C-NOT gates and a fault-tolerant F
gate:8-3













zcux2a ,y2b&L^ uc&L˜ ^ ua ,b ,z1ab&L .
~2!
Now the n players measure their shares of the first three
encoded registers along the commonly agreed computational
basis. Regarded as classical Reed-Solomon codes, their pub-
licly announced measurement outcomes can then be used to
infer the ~quantum! measurement results of the first three
registers along the commonly agreed computational basis.
Suppose the inferred measurement results of the first three
registers are l1 ,l2, and l3, respectively. Then, by adding l1
to the fourth register, l2 to the fifth register, and l1y1l2x
2l1l2 to the sixth register, they get the state vq
l3zux ,y ,z
1xy&L . Finally, they obtain the state ux ,y ,z1xy&L , which is
the result of a generalized Toffoli operation, by applying a
suitable phase-shift gate in the sixth register then followed
by another controlled-controlled-phase-shift operator to the
first and second registers. ~As I have discussed previously,
players may perform these operations without any commu-
nication because of the choice of the QECC’s C1 and C2
together with the fact that l1 ,l2, and l3 are classical data.!
To ensure accuracy, the players perform the above pro-
cess r times to the r supposedly identical signal states. In this
way, they end up by implementing r identical generalized
Toffoli operators if all players are honest. @At this point,
readers may wonder why I do not check the purity of ancil-
lary state (a ,b50
q21 ua ,b ,ab&L /q directly. The reason is that
random parity checking does not work for this ancillary state
because the state of the untested particles will be altered by
the test itself. Readers may also ask why I do not apply the
fault-tolerant Fourier transformation gate to obtain (k50
q21uk&L
from u0&L . The reason is that all known fault-tolerant Fou-
rier transformation gates for the @@n ,1,d##q QECC C1 with
3d<n12 to date require collective measurements on the
encoded quantum registers and hence are liable to error in
the presence of cheaters. An alternative method to perform
the required measurement is to assign once and for all a
randomly chosen player for each of the r5Olog(1/e) sup-
posedly identical signal states. Whenever it comes to a mea-
surement, players teleport their states to be measured to the
corresponding assigned player who then makes the necessary
measurement and publicly announces the measurement out-
come.
~7! In order to make sure that the players indeed follow
the distributed FTQC in step ~6! honestly, they carry out the
random parity verification test Olog(1/e) times on their
final state using the same method as described in step ~5!.
Finally, to obtain the value of z5 f (x1 ,x2 , . . . ,xn), the n
players separately measure their share of quantum registers
that encode the value of z along the commonly agreed com-
putational basis, and then publicly announce their measure-
ment outcomes. They then infer the value of z using standard
classical Reed-Solomon code error correction.03230III. SECURITY OF THE QUANTUM SCHEME
Now, I claim that the above scheme correctly computes
the classical function z5 f (x1 ,x2 , . . . ,xn) with a probability
12l e for some fixed constant l >1, provided that no more
than d players cheat. In addition, those d[@(d21)/2# cheat-
ers know nothing about the private inputs of every honest
player and they cannot alter the final outcome z. These
claims are true even if all cheaters cooperate and have un-
limited computational power.
To prove the above claims, one observes that there are
four possible ways for the above scheme to go wrong,
namely, the presence of noise, bad instruments, eavesdrop-
pers, and cheating players. Remember that a cheater may
deliberately announce wrong measurement results and
thereby mislead others. One must also make the most pessi-
mistic assumption that all cheaters and eavesdroppers coop-
erate and control everything except the instruments in the
laboratories of the honest players. The cheaters may even
have unlimited computational power. Using the argument in
Ref. @4#, I first show that we can safely neglect the effect of
noise and bad instruments. Since all steps in the above
scheme are performed in a fault-tolerant manner, the theory
of FTQC tells us that with probability 12e we may assume
that noise and bad instruments simply affect the error syn-
dromes but not the quantum information encoded in the
states @15–17#. The theory of QECC also tells us that learn-
ing error syndromes give no information about the quantum
information encoded in the state @24,25#. Consequently, by
restricting myself to the evolution of quantum information
contained in the encoded quantum registers, I may analyze
the behavior of the above scheme in a noiseless environment
from now on.
Then it remains for me to show that no more than d
cheaters can obtain partial information on the private inputs
of some honest players. In addition, these cheaters cannot
alter the output of the classical function f. In order to do this,
one first has to understand the function of each step in the
scheme. Steps ~2! and ~3! are direct generalizations of the
entanglement-based quantum key distribution protocol pro-
posed by Lo and Chau in Ref. @4#. The aim of these two steps
is to share the almost perfectly encoded state uF& between
any two pairs of players so that they can teleport quantum
states in a fault-tolerant manner from one to another at a later
time in step ~4!. Step ~5! makes sure that every player fol-
lows step ~4! to distribute his or her private input as well as
the preset quantum registers using the QECC’s C1 and C˜ 1.
The actual computation is carried out in step ~6!, and finally,
the computational result is varified and measured in step ~7!.
A. Private inputs of an honest player are secure up to step 5
of the quantum scheme
I have two cases to consider in order to show that the d
[@(d21)/2# cheaters obtain no information on the private
inputs of the honest players up to the random parity verifi-
cation in step ~5! of the quantum scheme. The first case is
when the proving player i in step ~5! is honest. In this case,
the encoded state uF& sharing scheme in step ~3! between the
proving player i and all other honest players is a straightfor-8-4
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of Lo and Chau in Ref. @4#. More important, as stated in
Appendix B, the random parity test in step ~5! maps the basis
B5$(k50q21vqkbuk ,k1a&/Aq%a ,bPFq to basis B up to a global
phase. Therefore the proof of Lo and Chau in Ref. @4# ap-
plies. In particular, they have already proved that the fidelity
of every encoded state uF& shared between any two honest
players is at least 12e even in the presence of eavesdroppers
and cheaters @4#. Then in steps ~4! and ~5!, eavesdroppers
and cheaters can access only the public classical communi-
cations between the honest players. Fortunately, these clas-
sical messages contain no information about the teleported
quantum state @21#. Hence, no one apart from the sender and
the receiver knows the teleported state. Thus, these d cheat-
ers have access to at most their share of d quantum registers
of the distributed encoded state uxi&L . Since C1 is a
@@n ,1,d##q QECC, knowledge of the d quantum registers in
the hands of the cheaters contains no information on the
private input xi at all.
The second case is that the proving player i is dishonest.
Clearly, the job of the dishonest player i is to somehow mis-
lead the other players into believing that he or she is honest.
More precisely, player i tries to devise a method ~possibly
with the help of the other d21 cheaters in the system! so as
to pass the verification test in step ~5! with a probability
greater than 12l e for some fixed positive constant l . Note
that measuring every quantum register of an arbitrary quan-
tum codeword of the @@n ,1,d##q random polynomial QECC
C1 along the commonly agreed computational basis gives a
classical @n ,d ,n2d11#q Reed-Solomon codeword. In addi-
tion, if the C1 encoded quantum state uC& contains d erro-
neous quantum registers, then after measuring along the
computational basis, we end up getting a classical Reed-
Solomon codeword with at most d erroneous registers. Since
d,n/4 @25,26#, if an error can be handled by the QECC C1,
the corresponding error after measurement can be handled by
the corresponding classical Reed-Solomon code. Moreover,
a coarse-grained measurement, that is, the process of mea-
suring each quantum register along the computational basis
together with the inference of the quantum state from the
Reed-Solomon code, can be regarded as a projective mea-
surement along the C1 encoded computational basis on the
quantum state. In the verification step ~5!, all the n2d hon-
est players indeed measure the quantum states along the
commonly agreed computational basis. The random parity
check does not alter the state of the unmeasured quantum
particles. Therefore, the coarse-grained measurements per-
formed by the honest players commute with each other; and
hence each coarse-grained measurement result will in no way
change the outcome of all subsequent measurements @4#.
Thus, theoretically, the honest players may push their coarse-
grained measurement forward to the time when the quantum
states are just prepared. Consequently, the probability that
cheating player i will pass the quantum verification test in
step ~5! cannot exceed the probability of passing a classical
random parity verification test in which player i is allowed to
prepare only a classical mixture of states @4#. Clearly, the
probability that player i cheats and yet he or she passes the03230classical verification test is no greater than 1/qr where r is
the number of independent rounds of tests performed. Con-
sequently, by repeating the quantum random parity test
logq(1/e) times, the probability that player i cheats and yet he
or she passes the quantum verification test in step ~5! is at
most e. Once the quantum verification test is passed, the
fidelity of the remaining untested quantum states as being a
valid input uxi& is equal to 12l e for some constant l inde-
pendent of n and e. Thus, the entropy of each of the untested
quantum states is equal to log zq1l e . Hence, the cheaters
have an exponentially small amount information about the
private inputs of every honest player @4#. Using a similar
argument, I know that the fidelity of the distributed preset
quantum registers u0&L and u0&L˜ is also equal to 12l e .
Therefore, I conclude that if there are at most d cheaters
and they choose to perform measurements individually, then
the probability that these cheaters can obtain partial informa-
tion on the private inputs of the honest players is bounded
from above by l e for some fixed constant l .0 up to step
~5! of the quantum scheme.
In the event that the players choose to teleport their ran-
dom parity state to the verifier who then makes the necessary
measurement, the proof of security up to step ~5! is similar.
Note that if the verifier is honest, then the above proof ap-
plies. On the other hand, if the verifier cheats, two things
may happen. First, the verifier may wrongly announce an
inconsistent result. This leads to an immediate abortion of
the scheme; hence, he or she cannot obtain any extra infor-
mation on the private input of an honest player. Second, the
verifier may turn a blind eye to a measurement result that is
inconsistent with the no cheater or eavesdropper assumption.
Since d/n,1/6, a nonzero fraction of the verifiers are hon-
est. So, after Olog(1/e) rounds of random parity tests, the
probability that the private input of an honest player leaks
out is less than l e for some fixed constant l .0 up to step
~5! of the quantum scheme.
Thus I conclude that if there are at most d cheaters and
the players choose to teleport the particles encoding the ran-
dom parities to the verifiers before making measurements,
then the probability that cheaters obtain partial information
on the private input of an honest player is less than l e for
some fixed constant l .0.
B. Cheater cannot alter the computation result
Now I proceed to show that these d cheaters cannot alter
the outcome of the function evaluation f with a probability
greater than e in steps ~6! and ~7! of the quantum scheme.
Since one may regard any illegal quantum manipulation by
the d cheaters as decoherence acting on up to d quantum
registers in the QECC C1, the theory of FTQC implies that
any quantum manipulation by these cheaters cannot alter the
final outcome of the function f. Nevertheless, the theory of
FTQC assumes that all measurements of the encoded quan-
tum state and manipulation of classical data are error-free. So
it remains for me to show that measurement and classical
data manipulation by cheaters also cannot alter the outcome
of the function f.8-5
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sible operations in the scheme that require measurement or
classical message communication, namely, the verification
test and the generalized Toffoli gate. As I have discussed
previously, incorrect measurement or classical message
broadcasting in a verification test results in the immediate
abortion of the scheme. Hence it cannot alter the final output
of the function f. So it remains for me to consider the case of
a generalized Toffoli gate. Recall that the generalized Toffoli
gate is collectively synthesized by the n players from the
verified distributed encoded state u0&L˜ in step ~6!. Fortu-
nately, if the players choose to perform their measurements
individually, then all measurement results in step ~6! are in
either the @n ,d ,n2d11#q or the @n ,n2d ,d#q Reed-
Solomon code forms. Hence the d cheaters cannot alter the
measurement outcome and the value of z.
On the other hand, if they choose to teleport their states to
their corresponding randomly assigned player, then in order
to pass the final random parity test in step ~7! with a prob-
ability greater than e, the cheaters must arrange the state of
the final outcome z5 f (x1 ,x2 , . . . ,xn) for each of the r
5Olog(1/e) copies of quantum particles to be almost iden-
tical. This is possible only when all the r randomly assigned
players who are responsible for measurement cheat, since the
probability that all randomly assigned players cheat is equal
to (d/n)r5O(e). Consequently, the probability that the d
cheaters can alter the final value of z without being detected
is equal to l e for some fixed positive constant l .
C. Cheater cannot obtain partial information during
distributed computing of the function f
Although cheaters cannot alter the final outcome of the
computation with a probability greater than l e for some
fixed positive constant l , readers may ask if these cheaters
can obtain partial information on the private input of an hon-
est player in steps ~6! and ~7!. Now, I show that this is not
possible. Using the same argument as in Sec. III B together
with the choice of @@n ,1,d##q codes C1 and C2, the only
possible place for information leakage is the measurement
performed by the players during the implementation of a
generalized Toffoli gate. As I have discussed in Sec. III B, if
the players choose to measure individually, then the d cheat-
ers cannot alter the joint measurement result that is required
during the collective and distributive synthesis of the ancil-
lary state (a ,b50
q21 ua ,b ,ab&L /q as well as during the imple-
mentation of the generalized Toffoli gate. Moreover, the
theory of QECC tells us that the value of these measure-
ments contains no information on the distributed encoded
state ux ,y ,z&L . Recall that the d cheaters have access only to
their shares of the entangled quantum state together with the
classical information on the measurement results on the
fault-tolerant generalized Toffoli gate. Since C1 is an
@@n ,1,d##q QECC, this information alone is not enough for
the cheaters to obtain any information on ux ,y ,z&L and hence
the private inputs of an honest player.
On the other hand, if the players choose to teleport their
corresponding states to the randomly assigned players before
making measurements, then we cannot control the action of a03230cheating assigned player. Nonetheless, by looking into the
synthesis scheme of the ancillary state (a ,b50
q21 ua ,b ,ab&L used
in step ~6!, we see that the cheating assigned player can only
alter the third encoded quantum register of this ancillary
state. In other words, the cheating assigned player can only,
after error correction, alter the state of the last quantum reg-
ister in Eq. ~2!. Right after all players teleported their corre-
sponding quantum registers to the cheating assigned player,
the d cheaters would control the first three encoded quantum
registers together with shares of the distributed encoded
fourth, fifth, and sixth registers. Consequently, the reduced
density matrix of the quantum registers controlled by the
cheating assigned players is independent of x ,y , and z.
Hence it is impossible for the d cheaters to obtain partial
information on the private input of an honest player.
In summary, using the results in Secs. III A–III C, I con-
clude that the quantum secure multiparty computation
scheme in Sec. II is secure provided that no more than d
players cheat. Moreover, the security is unconditional for it
does not rely on any computational assumption.
In the alternative scheme that the players teleport their
quantum states to some randomly chosen players and let
these assigned players make the measurement, the proof is
similar that the d cheaters cannot alter the final outcome z
and that they cannot obtain extra information on the private
input of an honest player.
IV. COMPLEXITY AND SECURITY TRADEOFF
BETWEEN THE QUANTUM AND CLASSICAL SCHEMES
Clearly, the above quantum secure multiparty computa-
tion scheme requires O(n) quantum channels, a public clas-
sical unjamable broadcasting channel, and On2k log(1/e)
bits of quantum and classical communication in order to dis-
tribute and compute the classical function f, where k is the
length of each private input. Distributed FTQC of register-
wise addition, registerwise multiplication, and generalized
CNOT gate do not require any communication. Distributed
FTQC of a generalized Toffoli gate requires Onk log(1/e)
bits of classical message broadcast, or equivalently,
On2k log(1/e) bits of classical communication between the
players if they choose to perform their measurements indi-
vidually. Distributed FTQC of a generalized Toffoli gate re-
quires Onk log(1/e) bits of classical communication
should the choose to teleport the states and measure them
collectively by the randomly assigned players. Moreover, if
classically nondistributed computing f requires T time steps
and S space, then the distributed quantum computing scheme
in step ~6! above requires O(nT11e) time steps and
O(nS log T) space for any e.0 @27#. Hence, the amount of
communication required for distributed FTQC of a classical
function f is bounded from above by On2kT11elog1/e)
should players use the alternative teleportation plus measure-
ment method. In contrast, the best classical secure multiparty
computation scheme known to date requires O(n2) commu-
nication channels and O(n3kT) bits of communication. Thus
the quantum secure multiparty computation scheme requires
fewer channels and less computation or communication than
the best known classical algorithm to date.8-6
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over the classical one comes with a price tag. Recall that the
maximum number of cheaters tolerated by this quantum
scheme is related to the maximum possible distance d of a
QECC that maps one qary quantum register to n qary quan-
tum registers. Since I am using the @@n ,1,d##q QECC with
3d<n12, my scheme can tolerate only asymptotically up to
strictly fewer than 1/6 cheaters. On the other hand, the best
known classical scheme is unconditionally secure provided
that strictly more than one-half of the players are honest. In
other words, the quantum scheme reported here trades secu-
rity for communication complexity.
V. FULL-BLOWN QUANTUM CODE IS REQUIRED
IN THE QUANTUM SCHEME
At this point, readers may question if a full-blown QECC
is required in this quantum scheme because phase errors do
not affect the final outcome z. Rather surprisingly, the an-
swer is yes. In fact, I shall show that if C is a linear map
sending one quantum register to n quantum registers, then
any two of the three following conditions imply the third
one: ~1! C is a QECC correcting up to d spin flip errors; ~2!
C is a QECC correcting up to d phase shift errors; ~3! the
partial trace over any n2d registers gives no information on
the initial unencoded wave function.
The theory of QECC implies that ~1! and ~2! ) ~3!. Now
I shall show that ~1! and ~3! ) ~2!. The remaining case that
~2! and ~3! ) ~1! can be proven in a similar way. I divide the
n players into two groups. Groups A and B have n2d and d
players, respectively. By Schmidt polar decomposition, the
encoded normalized state (kakuk&L can be written
as r5( i , j ,k ,k8aka¯ k8Al i(k)l j(k8)uai(k)& ^ ubi(k)&^a j(k8)u
^ ^b j(k8)u, where uai(k)& and ubi(k)& are eigenvectors of the
reduced density matrices as seen by groups A and B, respec-
tively. Hence, taking a partial trace over group A, condition
~3! above tells us that
TrA~r!5 (
i , j ,k ,k8
aka¯ k8^a j~k8!uai~k !&ubi~k !&^b j~k8!u ~3!
is independent of ak . This is possible only if ubi(k)&[ubi&
and Al i(k)l j(k8)^a j(k8)uai(k)& are independent of k for all
i , j . Condition ~1! implies that
(
i , j
Al i~k !l j~k8!^biuS†ub j& ^ai~k !uS8ua j~k8!&5dk ,k8LS ,S8 ,
~4!
where S and S8 are spin flip operators such that each acts on
no more than d quantum registers, and LS ,S8 is independent
of k and k8 @24,25#. Since ubi& is independent of k, Eq. ~4!
holds if one replaces S by a general quantum error operator
G which acts on no more than d quantum registers. Since
groups A and B are arbitrarily chosen, Eq. ~4! is valid if one
replaces S8 by G. Once again, since ubi& is independent of k,
I conclude that Eq. ~4! is true even if one replaces the two
spin flip operators S and S8 by general quantum error opera-
tors G and G8 which act on no more than d quantum regis-03230ters. Consequently, C is a QECC correcting up to d errors
@24,25#. In particular, condition ~2! is valid.
VI. OUTLOOK
In summary, I have reported and proved the security of a
quantum secure multiparty scheme to compute classical
functions. The scheme makes essential use of fault-tolerant
quantum computation and a specially designed quantum er-
ror correcting code. While the quantum scheme tolerates
only about one-third the number of cheaters as the best
known classical scheme to date, it requires an asymptotically
smaller amount of communication between the players.
This scheme also tells us that higher dimensional Calder-
bank Shor Steane ~CSS!-like quantum error correcting codes
with fault-tolerant implementation have far-reaching applica-
tions outside the context of quantum-mechanical computa-
tion. While quantum code is not the only possible way to
protect quantum information during computation @28#, cheat-
ing players may do all the nasty things that only full-blown
quantum code can handle. Hence quantum code is an essen-
tial ingredient in this secure multiparty computation scheme.
Moreover, no binary @@n ,1,d##2 CSS code with d.n/7 is
known to date. Thus higher dimensional quantum code @29#
appears to be an essential ingredient in causing my scheme
to tolerate strictly fewer than one-sixth of cheating players.
Since fault-tolerant computation of a general non-CSS-like
code requires collective measurements @23#, it seems likely
that C1 should be a CSS-like code @30#. In addition, by re-
placing the random polynomial codes C1 and C2 by corre-
sponding continuous quantum codes @31# of the form
ua0&°*da1 da2dad21 ^ i51n ua01a1yi1
1ad21yi
d21&, my scheme also works for continuous quan-
tum variables.
Rains showed that no binary @@n ,1,2d11##2 quantum
code exists for d.n11 @32# and a simple modification of
the proof of the optimality of the five-quantum-register code
in Refs. @25# and @26# shows that @@n ,1,d##q codes must sat-
isfy d/n,1/4. Thus, it may be possible to design a QECC
based secure multiparty computation scheme that tolerates
up to one-quarter cheaters. It would be instructive to find
such scheme, if any.
It is also natural to ask if it is possible to extend this
scheme to perform multiparty computation of a quantum
function. That is, given a commonly agreed unitary operator
U as well as n private quantum states uxi&, is it possible to
compute U ^ iuxi&? Clearly, such a scheme exists if all the
players are honest. The players may simply modify the
scheme in this paper a little by dropping all the verification
tests that check the identity of the private inputs, final output,
and correct implementation of generalized Toffoli gates.
Nevertheless, there is no obvious way to use the random
parity test to check the validity of a general quantum state.
Moreover, a player may cheat by using delay measurement
tactics as in the proof of the impossibility of quantum bit
commitment @7#. It is, therefore, of great interest to know if it
is possible to achieve quantum multiparty computation of a
quantum function in the presence of cheaters.8-7
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APPENDIX A: PROCEDURE FOR TELEPORTING A
qARY STATE
The qary state quantum teleportation process goes as fol-
lows: The sender and the receiver first share the state uF&
5(k50
q21ukk&/Aq before the sender makes a joint measure-
ment on the quantum state uC& to be teleported and his or
her share of the state uF& along the basis $(k50
q21vq
bkua ,a
1k&/Aq%a ,bPFq% where vq is a primitive qth root of unity.
Then, the sender informs the receiver of the measurement
result. If the measurement outcome is (k50
q21vq
bkua ,a
1k&/Aq , then the receiver may reconstruct the quantum state
uC& by applying the unitary transformation ux&°vq
b(x2a)ux
2a& to his or her share of the original state uF&.
APPENDIX B: PROCEDURE FOR THE RANDOM
PARITY–HASHING TEST
Let us consider the basis B5$(k50q21vqkbuk ,k1a&/
Aq%a ,bPFq. Clearly, one may transform from one basis state
ket to another by local unitary operations alone. I denote the
set of all such transformations by T. Furthermore, the regis-
terwise generalized C-NOT operation maps the basis states
B^ B[$uA& ^ uB&:uA&,uB&PB% to B^ B up to a global
phase. Therefore the random parity–hashing test goes as fol-
lows: The two parties cooperate and randomly apply a trans-03230form f iPT for each share of the entangled quantum state
they obtain in step ~3!. Then they apply registerwise gener-
alized C-NOT operations to a number of randomly selected
pairs of their resultant entangled quantum states. Finally,
they measure the outcome of their final target quantum reg-
ister along the computational basis. They continue only if
their measurement result is consistent with the hypothesis
that their share of quantum particles are all in the state uF& .
If they continue, they apply suitable transformations giPT
on their remaining shares of quantum states so as to bring
them back to the state uF& . Clearly, this random parity
checking procedure is a direct generalization of that used in
Ref. @4#.
APPENDIX C: ACTION OF F
Here I show that Fu0&L5(k50
q21uk&L˜ . The proof of Fu0&L˜
5(k50
q21uk&L is similar. Recall that F denotes the collective
action of ua ,b&°vq
miabua ,b& by the ith player on their share
of the encoded quantum registers, where miPFq satisfies the
system of equations ( i51
n mi51 and ( i51
n miy i5( i51
n miy i
2
55( i51n miy in2150. Thus,
Fua0&L5 (














Summing over a1 in Eq. ~C1! gives bn2150; and then
summing over a2 gives bn2250. Inductively, I conclude
that Eq. ~C1! becomes (b0 ,b1 , . . . ,bn2dvq
a0b0 ^ i51
n ub01b1yi
11bn2dy in2d& . Hence, by putting a050, I obtain
Fu0&L5(k50
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